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Abstract  After  the  financial  crisis  of  2007--2008,  some  bank  performance  dimensions  have
been the  subject  of  debate,  two  of  which  are  bank  efficiency,  and  bank  risk-taking  behavior.
The literature  on  bank  efficiency  and  productivity  has  grown  considerably  over  the  last  three
decades, and  has  gained  momentum  in  the  aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis.  Interest  in  bank
risk-taking  behavior,  usually  focusing  on  its  links  to  monetary  policy,  has  been  relatively  low,
but has  also  increased  exponentially  in  more  recent  years.  This  paper  combines  these  two
streams of  research.  Specifically,  we  test  whether  more  inefficient  banks  take  greater  risks
when selecting  borrowers,  charging  interests  and  requiring  collateral,  and  whether  these  links
between inefficiency  and  risk  change  according  to  the  type  of  bank.  Our  analysis  centers  on  the
Spanish banking  system,  which  has  been  severely  affected  by  the  burst  of  the  housing  bubble
and has  undergone  substantial  restructuring.  To  test  our  hypotheses,  we  created  a  database
with information  on  banks  and  savings  banks,  their  borrowers  (non-financial  firms),  and  the
links between  them.  The  study  also  contributes  to  the  literature  by  considering  a  novel  profit
frontier approach.  Our  results  suggest  that  more  inefficient  banks  take  greater  risks  in  selecting
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Regulators  have  long  concerned  for  excessive  risk-taking  by
banks,  for  several  reasons,  among  which  we  should  highlightPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
∗ Corresponding author at: Departament d’Economia, Universitat
Jaume I, Campus del Riu Sec, 12071 Castelló de la Plana, Spain.





2340-9436/© 2019 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).vier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
vecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
he  existence  of  misaligned  incentives.  On  the  one  hand,
n  case  of  a  limited  liability  structure,  shareholders  would
espond  only  for  their  initial  investment,  which  some  authors
efer  to  as  a  ‘‘limited  skin  in  the  game’’  (Park  and  van  Horn,
015).  On  the  other  hand,  should  shareholders  respond  fork-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ate  risk-taking  decisions  and  socially  optimal  risk  taking
ould  be  more  closely  aligned  (Park  and  van  Horn,  2015).  In
his  regard,  the  relatively  poor  incentives  that  arise  under
















































































































ings  banks’  risk,  depending  on  whether  they  carry  out  their
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imited  liability  mechanisms  are  partly  related  to  the  mag-
itude  and  harshness  of  the  2007/08  financial  crisis,  given
he  links  with  excessive  banks’  risk  taking  during  the  pre-
eding  years.  Indeed,  under  limited  liability  structures,  the
ncentives  to  take  immoderate  risks  might  be  high,  since  the
ownside  exposure  is  limited  while  simultaneously  receiving
he  entirety  of  upside  gains  from  (risky)  projects.
Under  these  circumstances,  research  interest  in  bank
isk-taking  behavior  has  gained  momentum.  Most  studies
ave  examined  environmental  variables,  interest  rates  and
onetary  policy  in  combination  with  the  increased  risk
aken  by  banks,  in  an  attempt  to  ascertain  some  of  the
ikely  causes  of  the  financial  and  subsequent  economic  cri-
is.  Recent  literature  in  this  line  includes,  to  name  few,
ell’Ariccia  et  al.  (2014),  who  considered  a  theoretical
odel  to  show  that  a  decline  in  interest  rates  was  followed
y  an  increase  in  bank  risk  taking,  or  Boyd  and  Hakenes
2014),  who  nodelled  both  bank  risk-taking  behavior  and  reg-
latory  policy  in  times  of  crisis----proposing  two  models  which
iffered  due  to  considering  owner-managers’  capital  only  or
ncluding  outside  equity  holders.  In  the  case  of  Spain,  the
ocus  of  this  article,  Jiménez  et  al.  (2014),  using  a  rich  and
etailed  database,  have  analyzed  the  impact  of  monetary
olicy  on  the  risk  banks  assumed  in  the  period  between  2002
nd  2008  (see  also  Salas  and  Saurina,  2002,  2003;  Jiménez
nd  Saurina,  2004).
Taking  these  considerations  into  account,  we  analyze
he  links  between  bank  performance,  measured  via  fron-
ier  methods,  and  risk-taking  behavior  in  Spanish  banking.
elatively  few  studies  evaluating  performance  from  a  fron-
ier  perspective  have  explicitly  considered  how  controlling
or  risk  may  bias  bank  performance,  despite  the  relevance
f  the  issue.  In  this  literature,  although  we  might  consider
 variety  of  classifications,  two  different  categories  can
e  distinguished,  one  focusing  on  the  risk  behavior  of  the
ender,  and  the  other  on  that  of  the  borrower.  Therefore,
he  approach  we  consider  has  a  twofold  perspective----i.e.,
rom  the  perspective  of  the  lender,  and  from  the  perspective
f  the  borrower.
Specifically,  part  of  the  literature  controls  for  credit  risk
rom  a  lender  perspective,  considering  variables  at  the  bank
evel,  using  as  proxies  for  risk  either  loan  loss  provisions----or
on-performing  loans  when  the  information  is  available.
ome  almost  classic  studies  in  the  field  such  as  Hughes  and
ester  (1996)  acknowledged  this  reality,  concluding  that  dis-
egarding  the  impact  of  risk  could  lead  to  mismeasurements
f  banks’  inefficiency  levels.  Due  to  the  growing  relevance
f  this  issue,  the  number  of  bank  efficiency  evaluations  tak-
ng  risk  explicitly  into  account  has  increased  notably  during
he  last  twenty  years;  some  relevant  examples  are  Färe
t  al.  (2004),  Koetter  (2008),  Altunbaş  et  al.  (2007)  and  more
ecently,  Fiordelisi  et  al.  (2011)  and  Epure  and  Lafuente
2015),  among  others.
From  this  lender’s  perspective,  one  of  our  contributions
s  to  consider  several  variables  to  measure  bank  credit  risk.
espite  the  advantages  of  non-performing  loans  over  loan
oss  provisions  that  Berger  and  DeYoung  (1997a,b)  refer  to,
he  frequent  unavailability  of  data  on  the  former,  and  thePlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
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iscretionary  nature  of  the  latter,  led  us  to  consider  an  alter-
ative  strategy.  Specifically,  we  consider  some  accounting
odifications  to  control  provisions  that  add  a  discretional
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onsider  two  additional  proxies  for  credit  risk  which  help
s  discerning  whether  banks  could  have  actually  altered  (or
anipulated)  this  information  during  the  analyzed  period
Givoly  et  al.,  2010;  Lo,  2008).  The  frontier  approach
e  consider  takes  explicitly  into  account  the  quality  of
he  variables  that  affect  the  measurement  of  bank  prof-
ts  (Roychowdhury,  2006;  Dechow  et  al.,  2010).  As  far  as
e  know,  this  approach  has  rarely  been  used  in  the  liter-
ture  to  measure  bank  performance  from  a  profit  frontier
erspective.
Other  research  initiatives  have  considered  not  only  bank
redit  risk  but  also  the  risk  attributable  to  the  prob-
bility  of  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  of  their  borrowing
ompanies----i.e.,  considering  the  firm  level  and  therefore
xtending  the  perspective  to  the  borrowers.  In  this  case,
lthough  some  contributions  such  as  Foos  et  al.  (2010)  or
iordelisi  et  al.  (2011)  have  dealt  with  related  issues  (in  the
ontext  of  the  banking  industries  of  16  advanced  economies,
nd  for  European  banks,  respectively),  the  issue  as  to  how
he  risk  characteristics  of  the  borrowing  firms  interact  with
anks’  performance,  on  which  we  focus,  has  received  much
ess  research  attention.  However,  as  indicated  in  the  first
ines  of  this  introduction,  this  can  be  particularly  rele-
ant  today  since  during  the  expansion  years  prior  to  the
nancial  crisis,  several  factors----such  as  the  growth  in  secu-
itization,  the  degree  of  bank  competition,  external  finance
mbalances,  corporate  governance  in  the  banking  sector,  the
elative  tightness  of  monetary  policy,  or  the  intensity  of
ank  supervision  and  policy  responses  to  the  crisis----led  to
ooser  credit  standards  and  laxer  screening  of  borrowers,
ontributing  to  the  expansion  of  credit  and  to  the  deterio-
ation  of  loan  quality  in  many  Western  economies  (see  also
eys  et  al.,  2010).
Our  focus  in  this  study  is  on  the  Spanish  banking  system.
s  indicated  by  Foos  et  al.  (2010),  the  current  financial  cri-
is  is  a  clear  example  of  the  materialization  of  the  risks  that
anks  took  during  the  period  of  economic  growth,  includ-
ng  excessively  low  interest  rates  and  lax  criteria  for  issuing
oans.  In  the  case  of  Spain,  these  tendencies  were  espe-
ially  severe,  and  the  financial  crisis  has  had  devastating
onsequences  for  the  entire  economy,  leading  to  the  most
xtensive  restructuring  process  in  the  history  of  its  banking
ystem.  Some  authors  point  to  Spain  as  one  of  the  clearest
llustrations  of  the  issues  responsible  for  the  crisis----a huge
ousing  bubble,  partly  stoked  by  financial  innovation  (in  par-
icular  securitization),  which  led  to  looser  credit  standards
nd,  ultimately,  financial  instability  (Carbó-Valverde  et  al.,
012).  Against  this  background,  our  study  examines  whether
he  most  inefficient  Spanish  banks  offered  loans  to  firms  that
ere,  amongst  other  aspects,  financially  riskier.  To  do  so,  we
easure  risk  from  three  different  points  of  view:  (i)  ex  ante
isk;  (ii)  ex  post  risk;  and,  finally,  given  some  of  the  most
ntrinsic  characteristics  of  Spanish  savings  banks,  (iii)  sav-k-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
1 In the case of the Spanish banking industry, one of the most
elevant contributions in the specific field of bank efficiency and
oan loss accounting is Anandarajan et al. (2005), although with
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Risk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performanc
As  mentioned  above,  our  study  also  differs  from  previ-
ous  research  in  that  it  deals  with  risk  from  both  the  banks’
and  the  non-financial  firms’  perspectives.  First  we  analyze
whether  the  most  inefficient  banks  chose  riskier  customers,
and  second,  we  determine  whether  this  risk  materialized.
Results  show  that  the  most  inefficient  banks  did  actually
lend  to  riskier  customers.  We  also  examine  whether  this  risk
was  offset  by  higher  interest  rates.  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)
argue  that  the  riskiest  customers  are  willing  to  accept  higher
interest  rates,  since  they  understand  that  the  probability  of
their  repaying  the  loan  will  be  lower.  In  contrast,  Foos  et  al.
(2010)  find  that  some  banks,  in  order  to  issue  higher  vol-
umes  of  loans,  might  lower  the  interest  rates  and  require
less  collateral.
The  article  proceeds  as  follows.  After  this  introduc-
tion,  second  section  presents  the  key  assumptions  and
empirical  predictions;  third  section  describes  the  models
used  to  measure  bank  performance;  fourth  section  explains
the  econometric  methodology  to  evaluate  the  impacts  on
performance;  fifth  section  briefly  describes  the  data  and
variables  (for  both  banks  and  their  borrowing  firms),  and
results  are  explained  and  reported  in  sixth  section.  Finally,
seventh  section  provides  some  concluding  remarks.
Hypotheses on the links between banks’
performance and the risk characteristics of
their borrowing firms
We  consider  three  different  hypotheses  regarding  the
relationship  between  bank  performance  and  risk-taking
behavior.  The  first  one  considers  whether  the  most  ineffi-
cient  banks  have  sought  to  increase  their  profits  by  granting
more  loans----even  to  firms  with  the  worst  financial  results.
The  second  hypothesis  considered  is  the  second  part  to
hypothesis  one.  We  will  first  consider  if  the  most  inefficient
banks,  due  to  the  fact  they  grant  riskier  credits,  offset  the
extra  risk  by  charging  higher  interest  rates  and,  second,  if
these  banks  provide  credit  to  companies  with  lower  proba-
bility  of  paying  back.  The  final  hypothesis  refers  to  savings
banks  only.  Specifically,  in  light  of  the  savings  bank  branch
geographic  expansion  of  the  end  of  1990s  and  2000s,  it  stip-
ulates  whether  savings  banks  behave  differently,  granting
new  loans  in  their  new  markets  compared  to  their  home
markets.
Hypothesis  1.  The  most  inefficient  banks  lend  to  riskier
borrowers
This  first  hypothesis  is  in  line  with  Berger  and  DeYoung’
(1997)  ‘‘bad  management’’  hypothesis.  These  authors  pro-
posed  four  hypotheses  to  analyze  the  relationship  between
risk  and  efficiency:  (i)  the  bad  management  hypothesis;  (ii)
the  skimping  hypothesis;  (iii)  the  moral  hazard  hypothesis;
and  (iv)  the  bad  luck  hypothesis.
According  to  the  ‘‘bad  management’’  hypothesis,  banks’
low  efficiency  is  related  to  poor  management  skills,  which
might  lead  to  taking  excessive  risks.  Therefore,  there  is  aPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
positive  relationship  between  banks’  inefficiency  and  the
risk  in  which  they  incur.  In  addition,  Williams  (2004)  found
empirical  evidence  of  this  ‘‘bad  management’’  hypothesis







ypothesis  1a.  The  most  inefficient  banks  will  lend  to  less
rofitable  or  more  inefficient  firms
This  hypothesis  considers  the  lagged  Z-score  as  a  depen-
ent  variable.  When  banks  have  to  make  a  decision  on
hether  or  not  to  grant  a  loan  to  a  firm,  the  information
hey  possess  is  related  to  the  firm’s  balance  sheet  and  profit
nd  loss  account  corresponding  to  the  previous  year.  If  the
ending  banks  grant  a  loan  to  a  company  with  solvency  prob-
ems,  this  can  be  considered  as  an  ex  ante  risk.  Such  prior
nformation  can  be  considered  ‘‘hard  information’’,  and  is
ased  on  objective  criteria.
However,  another  type  of  information,  called  ‘‘soft  infor-
ation’’  (Berger  and  Udell,  2002)  can  also  affect  lending
ecisions.  This  soft  information  cannot  be  observed  by  third
arties,  and  is  based  on  the  data  obtained  from  the  relation-
hip  with  the  company,  the  owner,  and  the  local  community.
 second  hypothesis  is  therefore  required  to  capture  the
ffect  of  ex  post  risk.
ypothesis  1b.  Firms  that  have  access  to  credit  from  inef-
cient  banks  are  more  likely  to  go  bankrupt
Berger  and  DeYoung  (1997a,b)  find  empirical  evidence
hat  inefficiency  may  be  an  important  indicator  of  future
redit  problems  in  the  US  market.  However,  they  only  con-
ider  cost  efficiency  and  bad  loans,  but  not  the  profitability
f  the  borrowing  firm.  Other  studies  also  show  evidence  of
he  relationship  between  efficiency  and  loan  loss  provisions,
hich  can  also  be  considered  as  a  proxy  for  ex  post  risk  (see,
or  instance  Williams,  2004;  Chortareas  et  al.,  2011).
ypothesis  2.  The  most  inefficient  banks  charge  higher
nterest  rates  because  of  their  risk-taking  behavior
The  literature  reports  two  views  on  the  rates  of  interest
harged.  On  the  one  hand,  as  Jiménez  and  Saurina  (2004)
xplain,  in  a  context  of  asymmetric  information  between
he  bank  and  the  borrower,  loan  contracts  differ  according
o  borrower  type:  the  riskiest  borrowers  are  charged  higher
nterest  rates  and  do  not  provide  collateral,  whereas  the
east  risky  borrowers  are  charged  lower  interest  rates  and
re  required  to  provide  less  collateral.
On  the  other  hand,  authors  such  as  Ogura  (2006)  argue
hat,  in  a  competitive  environment,  in  order  to  attract  new
ustomers,  banks  should  charge  lower  interest  rates.  Foos
t  al.  (2010)  finds  evidence  that  total  lending  increases  when
nterest  rates  are  lower.  These  authors  find  a  relationship
etween  loan  growth  and  banks’  risk  taking  between  1997
nd  2007  in  16  advanced  economies.
In this  study,  we  follow  the  arguments  of  Jiménez  and
aurina  (2004), and  our  hypothesis  is  therefore  that  the  most
nefficient  banks  charge  their  clients  higher  interest  rates.
n  addition,  the  analysis  is  extended  to  test  whether  riskier
anks  lend  to  companies  that  cannot  provide  so  much  col-
ateral.  Berger  and  Udell  (1990)  present  empirical  evidence
or  the  U.S.  market  that  the  guarantees  are  more  fre-k-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
uently  associated  with  riskier  borrowers  and  riskier  banks.
n  the  same  vein,  and  for  the  Spanish  case,  Jiménez  and
aurina  (2004)  show  that  the  probability  of  firms’  bankruptcy
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ypothesis  3.  Savings  banks’  inefficiency  will  affect  the
ype  of  borrowers  according  to  whether  they  are  located  in
he  savings  bank’s  home  markets  or  new  markets
Until  the  end  of  1988,  Spanish  banking  regulations  did  not
llow  savings  banks  to  expand  geographically.  They  could  not
perate  outside  their  own  region  (or  comunidad  autónoma)
f  origin,  or  what  may  be  more  properly  defined  as  their
ome  or  natural  markets  (Fuentelsaz  et  al.,  2004;  Illueca
t  al.,  2009,  2014).  However,  at  the  end  of  1988,  the  barri-
rs  were  lifted  and  savings  banks  were  able  to  expand  into
ew  markets,  usually  in  other  regions.  Some  of  them  opened
ranches  outside  their  traditional  geographic  boundaries,
lthough  today,  the  territorial  distribution  of  savings  banks  is
till  conditioned  by  the  pre-1989  regulations  on  geographical
xpansions.
These  institutions  originally  specialized  in  lending  to
mall  businesses  in  their  own  city  or  province,  in  other
ords,  their  home  markets.  Since  1975,  state  regulations
ad  restricted  the  geographic  scope  of  savings  banks’  oper-
tions  to  their  natural  markets.  However,  the  European
anking  harmonization  process  of  the  1980s  meant  the  sav-
ngs  banks’  sector  underwent  extensive  deregulation  to
ncrease  their  competitiveness  in  a  process  that  included
he  lifting  of  barriers  to  territorial  expansions.  We  will  there-
ore  define  the  savings  banks’  market  of  origin----or  natural
arket----in  this  particular  context,  in  line  with  Illueca  et  al.
2009,  2014).  Specifically,  we  adopt  Illueca  et  al.’s  (2014)
efinition  of  the  home  market  of  a  savings  bank  i  as  those
rovinces  that  met  at  least  one  of  the  following  two  criteria
n  1988:  (a)  savings  bank  i  has  more  than  5%  of  the  total  num-
er  of  the  branches  of  all  of  the  banks  located  in  a  province;
r  (b)  savings  bank  i has  more  than  50%  of  its  own  branches
n  a  province.2
Some  authors  argue  that  banks  operate  differently  in
heir  home  markets  than  they  do  in  new  markets.  For
nstance,  Illueca  et  al.  (2009)  show  that  savings  banks
xpanding  geographically  outside  their  home  markets  obtain
igher  productivity  gains.  We  consider  this  hypothesis  to
ssess  whether  savings  banks  behave  differently  depending
n  the  markets  in  which  they  are  located.  On  the  one  hand,
e  ask  whether  savings  banks,  in  an  attempt  to  grant  more
oans,  adopt  riskier  credit  policies  in  new  markets  either
ecause  they  lack  ‘‘soft  information’’  on  the  new  markets,
r  because  of  more  ‘‘aggressive’’  competitive  practices.
llueca  et  al.  (2014)  found  evidence  for  different  behavior
mong  Spanish  savings  banks,  showing  that  savings  banks’
eographic  expansion  is  associated  with  increased  risk.  In
ontrast,  if  savings  banks  have  market  power  in  their  home
arkets  they  will  be  able  to  charge  higher  interest  rates.
his  hypothesis,  in  turn,  can  be  divided  into  two:
ypothesis  3a.  Savings  banks’  inefficiency  will  influence
he  probability  of  bankruptcy  of  their  borrowers  according
o  their  locationPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
Following  the  deregulatory  initiatives  of  the  1980s  and
990s,  most  savings  banks  began  ambitious  geographic









M.  García-Alcober  et  al.
xpansion  plans  outside  their  traditional  (or  home)  markets.
s  Shaffer  (1998)  stated,  entering  new  markets  can  gener-
te  adverse  selection  problems,  which  might  affect  savings
anks’  risk-taking  behavior  in  new  markets.
ypothesis  3b.  Savings  banks’  inefficiency  will  influence
he  interest  rate  corporate  borrowers  pay  according  to  their
ocation
This  hypothesis  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  savings  banks
ould  have  market  power  in  the  regions  where  they  have  tra-
itionally  operated----i.e.  in  their  home  markets.  Wong  (1997)
roposed  a  theoretical  model  according  to  which  the  inter-
st  margins  of  banks  are  positively  related  to  their  market
ower  and  their  credit  risk.  For  a  database  of  banks  from  80
ountries  during  the  years  1988--1995,  Demirgüç-Kunt  and
uizinga  (1999)  show  that  lower  levels  of  market  power
ead  to  lower  margins  and  higher  profits.  Foreign  banks  had
igher  margins  and  profits  than  their  domestic  counterparts
n  developing  countries,  while  in  developed  countries  the
pposite  result  was  found.
As  we  shall  see  in  fourth  section,  the  direction  of  causal-
ty  is  an  issue  worth  investigating,  although  this  would
eserve  a  specific  examination.  What  we  would  like  to  point
ut  in  this  section  is  that  some  of  the  literature  considered
ere  has  focused  on  explaining  bank  efficiency/inefficiency
or  productivity),  and  the  likely  existence  of  reverse  causal-
ty.  However,  our  point  is  rather  how  banks’  inefficiency
ight  impact  on  their  borrowers.  Therefore,  although
ne  might  conclude  this  literature  has  not  been  correctly
elected,  our  hypotheses  should  actually  be  interpreted  as
art  of  some  indirect  effects.  For  instance,  some  variables
uch  as  the  poor  senior  management  practices  referred  to
y  the  ‘‘bad  management’’  hypothesis  (Berger  and  DeYoung,
997a,b)  might  impact  on  the  bank’s  efficiency  and  this,  in
urn,  have  an  effect  on  different  risk  variables  at  the  firm
borrower)  level.  This  would  imply  that  poor  senior  prac-
ices  have  not  a  direct  impact  on  borrowers’  risk  but  rather
n  indirect  impact  via  bank  inefficiency.  Unfortunately,  con-
ributions  evaluating  the  links  (either  direct  or  indirect)
etween  non-financial  firms  (i.e.,  data  at  the  firm  level)  and
heir  lenders’  inefficiency  levels  are  almost  entirely  yet  to
ome,  making  this  section  difficult  to  place  rightly  in  the
iterature.
erformance measurement: a profit frontier
odel
ome  banks  perform  better  than  others.  This  is  an  indis-
utable  fact,  but  how  do  we  actually  recognize  a  highk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
erforming  bank?  Is  a  very  profitable  bank  a  high  performer?
efore  we  can  answer  this  question,  we  must  consider  the
egree  of  reliability  we  should  grant  to  the  variables  needed










































of  regressions  excluding  the  dynamic,  or  time  series,  loan
loss  provisions  from  the  dependent  variable.5 This  gives  us
two  sets  of  ‘‘non-manipulated’’  loan  loss  provisions,  i.e.
3 However, some authors such as Pérez et al. (2008) consider the
Bank of Spain enforces strict regulations on the accrual of loan loss
provisions which would impose, a priori, considerable restrictions
on banks’ ability to use managerial discretion.
4 This is done in the spirit of Nichols et al. (2009).
5 In 2000 the Bank of Spain promulgated the so-called ‘‘statistical
provision’’, according to which banks had to use their own reserves
to cover realized losses, making it easier for banks to maintain pro-ARTICLEBRQ-122; No. of Pages 18
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begin  by  defining  the  synthetic  components  that  make  up
the  profits  of  a  banking  firm:
˘  =  Operating  and  Financial  Revenues
−Operating  and  Financial  costs












where  ˘  are  the  profits,  rm and  um are  the  price  and  quantity
for  output  m  (m  =  1,  .  .  ., M),  respectively  (in  our  case  M  =  2,
and  includes  interest  income  and  other  operating  income),
pn and  xn are  the  price  and  quantity  for  input  n  (n  =  1,  .  .  ., N),
respectively  (in  our  empirical  application  N  =  3  and  includes
interest  expense,  personnel  expense  and  other  operating
expenses),  po is  the  estimated  price  (for  instance,  the  per-
centage  of  write-offs)  for  non-performing  asset  o,  and  nplo
refers  to  its  monetary  value  (quantity).
Clearly,  the  degree  of  accuracy  of  P  depends  on  the  qual-
ity  of  each  of  its  basic  elements.  In  this  regard,  the  literature
on  earnings  quality  assesses  of  the  quality  of  the  variables
that  have  an  impact  on  periodic  profits  (see,  for  instance
Dechow  et  al.,  2010,  for  a  review  of  some  of  the  variables
used  in  this  literature).  On  the  one  hand,  under  certain  spe-
cific  circumstances  there  are  several  choices  to  consider  at
the  moment  the  transactions  occur----or  there  are  incentives
to  manipulate  real  operations  (Roychowdhury,  2006)----and
this  can  affect  the  amount  of  flow  of  real  variables  to
consider  (um,  xn,  nplo).  This  is  what  the  earnings  quality
literature  refers  to  as  timeliness  and  timely  loss  recogni-
tion  (Dechow  et  al.,  2010).  On  the  other  hand,  when  prices
are  determined  internally  (a  situation  that  could  affect  both
pn and  po),  subjective  and  opportunistic  choices  could  be
considered  in  order  to  ‘‘embellish’’  (or  ‘‘manipulate’’)  the
profits  to  be  disclosed.  In  this  respect,  in  the  particular  case
of  the  banking  industry,  profits  are  commonly  manipulated
to  deal  with  the  problems  caused  by  credit  risk----bad  loans,
problem  loans  or  provisions  for  loans  losses  (see,  for  instance
Beaver  and  Engel,  1996).
From  the  perspective  of  earnings  quality,  banks  have
incentives  to  reduce  volatility  by  decreasing  earnings
in  years  with  an  unexpectedly  strong  performance,  and
increasing  earnings  in  years  with  a  weak  performance.  A
smoother  stream  of  earnings  might  help  to  reduce  the  infor-
mation  asymmetry  between  managers  and  outside  investors
(Beatty  and  Harris,  1999;  Beatty  et  al.,  2002;  Liu  and  Ryan,
2006).  In  the  majority  of  previous  studies,  there  is  evidence
that  managers  smooth  earnings  via  loan  loss  provision  and
recognize  security  gains  and  losses.  Accordingly,  these  are
the  variables  to  be  accounted  for  when  earnings  quality  is
under  scrutiny.
Different  approaches  can  be  considered  to  incorpo-
rate  the  risk-taking  behavior  of  banks  in  estimating
efficiency  indicators.  Following  the  previous  literature,
non-performing  loans  can  be  incorporated  into  the  bank’s
production  function  as  a  bad  output  (or,  in  terms  of  the
profit  function,  an  expense  that  decreases  total  profits).Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
Under  Spanish  accounting  standards,  banks  must  classify  a
loan  as  non-performing  when  either  interest  or  principal
payments  are  more  than  90  days  overdue.  In  addition,  all







s  non-performing,  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  they  are
verdue.
Because  many  of  these  loans  are  finally  repaid,  writing
ff  the  whole  amount  of  non-performing  loans  (npl)  as  an
xpenditure  would  lead  to  overestimation  of  the  effects
f  risk  on  profit  efficiency  scores.  We  therefore  take  an
lternative  approach  that  consists  of  including  loan  loss  pro-
isions  (LLP,  defining  LLP  =∑O
o=1ponplo)  as  an  expenditure
n  the  profit  function.  Under  Spanish  banking  regulations,
ank  managers  estimate  LLP  following  a  strict  set  of  rules
nstituted  by  the  Bank  of  Spain,  which  depend  heavily  on
he  time  payments  are  overdue.  However,  Bank  of  Spain
ules  determine  the  minimum  losses  a  bank  must  recognize
nce  a  loan  has  been  defined  as  non-performing,  leaving
he  banks  with  considerable  room  for  discretion.3 To  miti-
ate  the  effects  of  the  potential  manipulation  of  LLP, our
pproach  consists  of  using  expected  loan  loss  provisions  as
n  expenditure,  instead  of  realized  loan  loss  provisions.  This
eveals  whether  banks’  loan  loss  provision  decisions  to  man-
ge  earnings  or  capital  (and,  therefore,  circumvent  strict
ccounting  rules  by  over-  or  under-provisioning  assets,  or
isclassifying  them)  are  successful  or  not.  As  Pérez  et  al.
2008)  state,  if  they  were  successful,  having  painstaking  reg-
lations  on  LLP  might  be  irrelevant,  and  that  ‘‘there  is  merit
n  having  more  principles-oriented  accounting  standards’’
Pérez  et  al.,  2008,  p.  424).
Expected,  or  ‘‘non-manipulated’’  loan  loss  provisions  are
stimated  at  the  bank  level.  Specifically,  we  regress  LLP  on
he  increase  in  npl  in  t--2,  t--1  (backward  looking  compo-
ent)  and  t.4 Furthermore,  in  order  to  control  for  accounting
onservatism,  the  increase  in  npl  in  t  +  1  is  also  incorporated




t =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1nplt−2 +  ˇ2nplt−1 +  ˇ3nplt
+  ˇ4nplt+1 +  εt (2)
We  run  a  regression  for  each  bank  for  the  sample  period.
o  carry  out  the  estimation,  two  different  specifications  are
onsidered.  We  first  include  total  loan  loss  provisions  as
he  dependent  variable,  considering  not  only  the  specific
omponent  of  loan  losses,  but  also  the  dynamic  loan  loss
rovisions,  introduced  by  the  Bank  of  Spain  in  2000.  Since
he  dynamic  provisioning  system  had  a  profound  impact  on
he  relationship  between  npl  and  LLP,  we  run  a  second  setk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
isions for incurred losses embedded in the credit portfolios created
n expansion years. This rule ultimately enforced a counter-cyclical
LP that resulted in income smoothing practices by banks (Pérez


























































revenues  (we  focus  on  their  quality),  which  cannot  be  done
for  revenues  when  adopting  the  alternative  profit  efficiency
proposed  by  Maudos  and  Pastor  (2003).7ARTICLERQ-122; No. of Pages 18
 
tatic  (cross-section)  and  dynamic  (time  series),  for  which
e  consider  this  counter-cyclical  loan  loss  provision.6
Having  estimated  the  degree  of  earnings  manipulation
resent  in  the  Spanish  banking  system,  we  estimate  a  non-
onvex  short-run  profit  frontier  model.  This  model  basically
ollows  Färe  et  al.  (1994),  taking  the  original  variables  (in
he  case  of  the  bad  output,  considering  the  realized  loan
oss  provisions  only)  and  classifying  the  inputs  into  variable
xv)  and  fixed  (xf)  inputs  (see  also  Primont,  1993, for  a short-
un  cost  frontier  definition).  Therefore,  we  will  be  modeling
ariable  profit  maximization:
˘manip(rjm,  pjv ,  pjo)















zjujm ≥  um,  m  =  1,  .  . ., M,
J∑
j=1
zjxjv ≤  xv,  v  =  1,  .  .  ., V,
J∑
j=1
zjxjf ≤  xjf ,  f  =  1,  .  .  ., F,
J∑
j=1
zjnpljo ≤  nplo, o  =  1,  .  .  ., O,
J∑
j=1
zj =  1,
zj =  [0,  1].
(
here  rjm ∈  RM+ is  the  vector  of  output  prices  for  bank  j,
jm ≥  0,  and  we  also  have  variable  inputs  (netputs)  with
rices  pjv ∈  RV+,  v  =  1,  .  .  ., V.  Analogously,  uj ∈  RM+ is  the
ector  of  output  quantities  for  j,  xjv ∈  RV+ are  the  variable
etputs  for  bank  j  and  xjf ∈  RF+ are  the  fixed  netputs  for  the
ame  bank.  However,  compared  to  the  contributions  of  Färe
t  al.  (1994)  and  Primont  (1993)  we  are  considering  here  the
ole  of  risk  via  loan  loss  provisions.  Therefore,  we  have  that
plj ∈  RO+ is  the  amount  of  non-performing  loans  for  bank  j,
 =  1,  .  .  ., O,  and  pjo ∈  RO+ will  be  their  prices.
6 Considering cross section and time series estimations is also
elevant because of their economic implications since the formerPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
ould be adopting an industry perspective (i.e., each bank is com-
ared with the rest of the banks in the sample), whereas the latter
nvolves comparison only with the bank itself and would therefore
e focusing on income smoothing. r PRESS
M.  García-Alcober  et  al.
As  a  second  step,  we  will  re-run  the  previous  variable
rofit  maximization  model  (3),  but  replacing  the  variables
ubject  to  manipulation  with  their  estimated  values:
˘not manip(rjm, pjn, p̃jo)















zjujm ≥ um, m = 1, . . .,  M,
J∑
j=1
zjxjv ≤ xv , v = 1, . . ., V,
J∑
j=1
zjxjf ≤ xjf , f = 1, . . .,  F,
J∑
j=1




zj = [0,  1].
(4)
Obviously,  ˘not manip(rjm,  pjv , p̃jo)  will  provide  a  more
bjective  profit  target  for  each  bank,  as  profits  generated
y  earnings  manipulation  are  controlled  for  in  this  second
rogram.
Our  paper,  although  very  closely  related  to  the  liter-
ture  that  has  traditionally  evaluated  profit  efficiency  in
anking,  differs  in  some  regards.  Among  this  relevant  lit-
rature  we  should  highlight  contributions  by,  among  others,
erger  et  al.  (1993),  Berger  and  Mester  (1997),  DeYoung  and
asan  (1998), DeYoung  and  Nolle  (1996), Hughes  et  al.  (1996)
nd,  in  the  case  of  Spain,  the  study  by  Lozano-Vivas  (1997)
tands  out.  Despite  the  importance  of  these  contributions,
hey  are  not  entirely  comparable  to  ours  because  of  sev-
ral  issues,  being  the  most  important  one  that  we  propose  a
onparametric  approach,  as  opposed  to  the  parametric  ones
onsidered  by  most  profit  efficiency  studies  in  banking.
Although  less  important  in  number,  similarly  to  us  some
tudies  have  also  adopted  non-parametric  approaches  to
valuate  different  aspects  related  to  profits,  productivity
nd  efficiency  in  banking.  Among  them,  we  should  high-
ight  contributions  by  Devaney  and  Weber  (2002),  Färe  et  al.
2004), Ariff  and  Luc  (2008),  Fu  et  al.  (2016)  and,  in  the
ase  of  Spanish  banking,  Grifell-Tatjé  and  Lovell  (1999)  and
audos  and  Pastor  (2003).  While  the  vast  majority  of  these
tudies,  similarly  to  us,  match  the  quantities  and  prices  for
nputs  and  outputs,  Maudos  and  Pastor  (2003)  consider  the
lternative  profit  measure  in  order  to  allow  for  the  existence
f  market  power.  Although  this  approach  is  undoubtedly
nteresting,  it  cannot  be  directly  adopted  here  given  we
ust  decompose  the  different  components  of  both  costs  andk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
7 We  thank a reviewer for this comment. In addition, in a previous
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It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  interpretation  of  the
inefficiency  indices  is  a  bit  different  from  standard  inter-
pretations  of  efficiency/inefficiency  scores,  which  is  part  of
the  reasons  why  our  results  cannot  be  directly  compared  to
previous  contributions  in  the  field.  Specifically,  our  ineffi-
ciency  indices  should  be  interpreted  as  the  return  on  assets
(ROA)  lost  due  to  inefficiencies,  divided  by  total  assets.  A
key  advantage  of  this  type  of  index  is  that  it  is  always  posi-
tive  (since  we  compute  potential-observed  profit,  which  will
always  be  either  positive,  or  zero).
Econometric model
As  stated  above,  we  investigate  the  links  between  banks’
performance  and  their  borrowing  firms’  characteristics,
considering  the  three  main  hypotheses  presented  in  the  pre-
vious  section.
We  consider  two  types  of  analyses  with  regard  to  the
first  of  the  hypotheses  (Hypothesis  1),  related  to  the  per-
formance  of  firms’  lenders.  The  first  one  (Hypothesis  1a)
considers  bank  profit  efficiency  and  an  ex  ante  risk-taking
behavior.  The  firm’s  Z-score  is  the  proxy  for  the  ex  ante  risk,
and  it  is  calculated  with  data  from  the  period  before  the
bank  issues  the  credit.  To  do  this,  we  estimate  the  following
model  using  OLS:
Zij =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1XFij +  ˇ2XBij +  ˇ3XIij +  εij (5)
where  i  and  j  are  subscripts  corresponding  to  firm  i  and  bank
j,  respectively,  Zij is  the  Z-score,  XFij are  firm-specific  varia-
bles,  XBij are  bank-specific  variables,  X
I
ij are  the  bank  profit
inefficiency  variables  defined  in  the  previous  section,  and  ε
is  the  i.i.d.  error  term.
In  the  second  analysis  of  the  first  hypothesis  (Hypothesis
1b),  we  consider  ex  post  risk.  The  econometric  approach  to
test  for  this  type  of  risk  relies  on  a  logit  model  of  borrower
defaults.  In  this  case,  the  dependent  variable  is  BANKRUPT,
which  equals  one  if  a  firm  defaults  and  zero  otherwise:
BANKRUPTij =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1XFij +  ˇ2XBij +  ˇ3XIij +  εij (6)
Seven  different  models  are  tested  when  running  the
regressions  corresponding  to  both  Eqs.  (5)  and  (6).  For  the
first  four  models,  bank  inefficiency  is  measured  consid-
ering  the  variable  B  INEF  ROA, which  corresponds  to  the
‘‘manipulated’’  earnings  model  in  the  previous  section.
This  type  of  inefficiency  includes  loan  loss  provisions  in
the  estimation,  implying  that  we  are  controlling  for  risk.
A  univariate  analysis  is  considered,  and  then  we  include
firms’  control  variables  sequentially  (XFij ,  Models  (M1.2)
and  (M2.2)  for  Zij and  BANKRUPTij as  dependent  varia-
bles,  respectively),  banks’  control  variables  (XBij ,  Models
(M1.3)  and  (M2.3)  for  Zij and  BANKRUPTij as  dependent
variables,  respectively),  as  well  as  both  types  of  variables
simultaneously  (XFij and  X
B
ij ,  Models  (M1.4)  and  (M2.4)  for
Z and  BANKRUPT as  dependent  variables,  respectively).Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
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The  measurement  of  inefficiency  changes  in  the  fifth  and
sixth  models.  For  the  fifth  model  (Models  (M1.5)  and  (M2.5)
for  Zij and  BANKRUPTij as  dependent  variables,  respec-
methodology proposed in this paper to disentangle the relevance of










ively)  we  consider  B  INEF  ROA  CS,  corresponding  to  the
on-manipulated  short-run  model  described  in  Section  3,
nd  for  the  sixth  (Models  (M1.6)  and  (M2.6)  for  Zij and
ANKRUPTij as  dependent  variables,  respectively)  we  con-
ider  B  INEF  ROA  TS,  corresponding  to  the  non-manipulated
ong-run  model  (see  Section  3).  Finally,  in  Models  (M1.7)  and
M2.7),  two  additional  variables  are  included  in  order  to
ifferentiate  the  effects  of  commercial  banks  from  savings
anks  (these  would  be  also  bank-specific  variables,  XBij ).
The  objective  of  the  second  hypothesis  (Hypothesis  2),
elated  to  interest  rate  charges,  is  to  test  whether  ineffi-
ient  banks  charge  higher  interest  rates,  and  whether  they
end  to  firms  with  more  capacity  to  pledge  collateral.  The
ependent  variables  are,  initially,  interest  rates  the  firm
ays  (F  INT)  and,  in  a  second  stage,  an  inverse  measure  of
rm’s  ability  to  pledge  collateral  (F  INV  COLLAT).  Both  types
f  control  variables  (firms’  and  banks’)  are  included  in  the
egressions.  Similarly  to  the  models  featured  above,  we  also
onsider  different  models  for  each  type  of  efficiency  mea-
urement  (Models  (M3.1)--(M3.6)),  as  well  as  two  additional
ariables  to  test  for  differences  in  results  between  commer-
ial  banks  and  savings  banks  (Models  (M3.7)--(M3.8)).  The
odels  considered  are  as  follows:
 INTij =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1XFij +  ˇ2XBij +  ˇ3XIij +  εij (7)
 INV  COLLATij =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1XFij +  ˇ2XBij +  ˇ3XIij +  εij (8)
The  third  hypothesis  (Hypothesis  3),  related  to  sav-
ngs  banks’  expansion  strategies,  attempts  to  disentangle
hether  savings  banks’  behavior  in  their  home  markets  dif-
ers  from  that  in  the  new  markets.  Four  different  models
re  estimated.  The  first  two  (Models  (M4.1)  and  (M4.2))  con-
ider  as  dependent  variables  the  F ZSCORE  in  home  markets
nd,  in  a  second  stage,  in  new  markets  (Models  (M4.3)  and
M4.4)).  Models  (M4.1)  and  (M4.3)  consider  firms’  interest
s  the  dependent  variable  (F  INT),  whereas  Models  (M4.2)
nd  (M4.4)  consider  our  inverse  measure  of  the  firms’  ability
o  pledge  collateral  (F  INV  COLLAT).  All  regressions  include
wo  variables  of  the  firm  in  the  analysis,  i.e.  the  number
f  bank  relationships  (lagged),  F  BANK  REL, the  year  of  the
rm’s  registration  (F  REGIS); four  bank  variables  are  also
ncluded:  the  bank  loan  to  total  asset  ratio  (B  LOANTA),
ank  equity  to  total  assets  ratio  (B  EQTA), bank  deposits
o  total  assets  ratio  (B  DEPTA),  and  profit  inefficiency  (with
otal  loan  loss  provisions,  B  INEF  ROA). All  models  include
ear  and  industry  fixed  effects,  and  their  expressions  are  as
ollows:
 ZSCOREij =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1XFij +  ˇ2XBij +  ˇ3XIij +  εij (9)
 INTij =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1XFij +  ˇ2XBij +  ˇ3XIij +  εij (10)
The  analysis  of  the  opposite  direction  of  causality,  i.e.,
f  borrowers’  risk-taking  behavior  might  impact  on  their
enders  inefficiency  levels  deserves  a  specific  investigation
nd,  probably,  a  different  approach,  because  of  several  rea-
ons.  First,  our  main  objective  is  to  explain  how  banks’
nefficiency  impact  on  their  borrowers’  risk-taking  behav-
or.  While  the  other  direction  of  causality  might  also  bek-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
f  interest,  it  is  not  the  specific  aim  of  the  paper  and
aises  questions  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view.  Sec-
nd,  the  issue  as  to  what  determines  efficiency/inefficiency
as  been  debated  for  a long  time  by  the  efficiency  and
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Table  1  Descriptive  statistics  for  firms.
1st  quartile  Median  Mean  3rd  quartile  Std.dev.  N
Age  and  size
F REGIS  1979  1987  1984  1994  13.9  42,617
F SIZE 8.49821  9.05158  9.27089  9.81809  1.20994  42,617
F GROWTH −0.01805 0.07575  0.14705  0.19671  0.50908  40,895
F BANKREL 1.00  2.00  2.54  3.00  1.60  42,617
Profitability
F ROE  0.03166  0.10188  0.11367  0.20061  0.39842  42,614
F ROA  0.00788  0.04136  0.04767  0.08483  0.09076  42,617
Capital structure
F CURRENT  0.99513  1.18730  1.48753  1.56776  1.26156  42,611
F LEV  0.53992  0.70636  0.67532  0.83286  0.21499  42,617
Likelihood of  default
F INV  COLLAT  0.12295  0.62336  1.59210  1.38118  3.70202  42,551
F ZSCORE  1.83438  2.46602  2.65168  3.28539  1.22006  42,616
The table reports accounting and banking information for 42,617 firms during the period 1997--2009. All accounting variables refer to
one year before the start date of a new bank relationship. Variable definitions: F REGIS, year of firm registration; F SIZE, logarithm of





























































F ROA, return on assets; F CURRENT, current ratio; F LEV, ratio o
non-current assets; F ZSCORE, Altman’s Z-Score.
roductivity  literature  and,  even  today,  is  far  from  being
olved.  This  has  been  acknowledged  in  several  contribu-
ions  such  as  Simar  and  Wilson  (2007,  2011),  Balaguer-Coll
t  al.  (2007),  or  Banker  and  Natarajan  (2008), among  oth-
rs.  More  recently,  Bădin  et  al.  (2014)  has  summarized  most
ontributions  in  the  field,  proposing  new  methods  which  also
dvocate  to  evaluate  if  separating  the  two  stages  is  possible,
.e.,  measuring  efficiency  in  the  first  stage  and  analyzing
he  determinants  in  the  second  stage  (see  Daraio  et  al.,
018).  Third,  it  might  also  raise  the  question  regarding  the
alidity  of  some  causality  tests  when  one  of  the  variables
s  estimated  via  linear  programming  methods----i.e.,  with-
ut  satisfying  the  independence  (in  the  statistical  sense)
ondition.
ata and variables
n  this  section,  the  information  does  not  entirely  coincide
ith  that  in  the  previous  sections,  since  we  collected  infor-
ation  not  only  on  Spanish  banking  firms  but  also  on  Spanish
on-financial  firms  in  order  to  create  a  single  database  at  the
usiness-bank-year  level.  This  will  enable  us  to  model  the
elationship  between  the  lending  banks  and  their  potential
orrowers----  i.e.,  new  loan  applicants.
Data  from  non-financial  firms  come  from  the  SABI
atabase  (Sistema  de  Análisis  de  Balances  Ibéricos),  which
s  based  on  the  public  commercial  registry  in  Spain.  It  con-
ains  accounting  data  and  banking  information  on  42,617
on-financial  firms  for  the  1997--2009  period.  All  accounting
ariables  (balance  sheet  and  profit  and  loss  account)  refer
o  the  year  before  the  start  of  the  new  banking  relationship.
able  1  presents  the  summary  statistics  for  the  non-financialPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
rms  in  the  database,  reporting  information  on  firms’  size,
iquidity,  productivity  and  firm-bank  relationship.
Data  on  banking  firms  include  financial  statements,





al debt to total assets; F INV COLLAT, ratio of total bank debt to
nformation  for  commercial  banks  is  provided  by  the  Spanish
ssociation  for  banking  (AEB,  Asociación  Española  de  Banca),
hereas  that  for  savings  banks  comes  from  the  Spanish  con-
ederation  of  savings  banks  (CECA,  Confederación  Española
e  Cajas  de  Ahorros).  Table  2  provides  accounting  informa-
ion  on  51  financial  institutions,  both  commercial  banks  and
avings  banks.
The  information  for  borrowing  firms  corresponds  to  the
eft-hand-side  of  each  equation,  whereas  the  information
or  lenders  (banks)  is  in  the  corresponding  right-hand-side,
rom  Eqs.  (5)--(10).  Matching  these  two  sets  of  informa-
ion  is  relatively  straightforward,  given  each  firm  has  to  be
ssociated  with  its  corresponding  lenders  and,  should  the
ormer  operate  with  several  banks,  this  information  would
e  included  more  than  once.
ata  on  banking  firms
ur  decomposition  of  banks’  profits  requires  detailed  infor-
ation  on  revenues,  costs  and  loan  loss  provisions.  All  three
agnitudes  have  associated  both  quantities  and  their  cor-
esponding  prices.  In  the  case  of  loan  loss  provisions  these
ssociated  quantities  correspond  to  the  non-performing
oans.  In  the  case  of  costs,  the  three  specified  categories
orrespond  to  the  cost  of  funds  (total  interest  expenses),
he  cost  of  labor  (personnel  expenses),  and  other  operating
xpenses.  We  will  refer  to  these  three  magnitudes  as  VC1,
C2 and  FC1,  respectively----the  first  two  variables  reflect
ariable  costs,  whereas  the  last  one  refers  to  the  costs  gen-
rated  by  fixed  assets  and  consequently  represents  a  fixedk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ost.  These  three  cost  categories  are  generated  by  their  cor-
esponding  input  categories,  i.e.  loanable  funds  (or  financial
apital,  xv1),  number  of  employees  (xv2),  and  fixed  assets
or  physical  capital,  xf1).
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics  for  banks.
1st  quartile  Median  Mean  3rd  quartile  Std.dev.  N
Balance  sheet
B  SIZE  16.9232  18.1393  18.0140  19.3800  1.6013  51
B EQTA 0.0527  0.0634  0.0663  0.0725  0.0261  51
B DEPTA 0.3717  0.4378  0.4491  0.5148  0.1059  51
B LOANTA 0.5924  0.6555  0.6685  0.7608  0.1086  51
Profitability
B ROA  0.0060  0.0079  0.0081  0.0099  0.0043  51
B ROE  0.0950  0.1211  0.1240  0.1555  0.0551  51
Inefficiency
B INEF  ROA  0.0000  0.0000  0.0057  0.0058  0.0121  51
B INEF  ROA  CS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0052  0.0042  0.0119  51
B INEF  ROA  TS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0053  0.0040  0.0119  51
The table reports accounting information for 51 banks during the 1997--2009 period. Variable definitions: B SIZE, logarithm of total assets;
B DEPTA,  deposits to total assets ratio; B EQTA, equity to total assets ratio; B LOANTA, loans to total assets ratio; B ROA, return on total
assets; B ROE, return on equity; B INEF ROA: profit inefficiency (with total loan loss provisions); B INEF ROA CS,  profit inefficiency


























provisions based on bank time-series regressions).
Defining  bank  outputs  is  a  more  difficult  task,  and  has
been  an  ongoing  concern  for  many  years;  some  of  the  first
relevant  contributions  were  Fixler  and  Zieschang  (1992)
and,  in  the  context  of  efficiency  in  banking,  Berger  and
Humphrey  (1992).  According  to  Tortosa-Ausina  (2002),  there
are  three  approaches  to  define  banks’  output,  i.e.  the  asset
approach,  the  value  added  and  the  user  cost.  All  these  three
approaches  correspond  to  the  intermediation  approach  (as
opposed  to  the  production  approach),  the  most  widely  used
approach  to  define  bank  activities.  The  definition  of  bank
outputs  has  generally  been  conditioned  by  the  available
statistical  information,  which  in  most  cases  is  scant,  with
the  result  that  most  studies  have  disregarded  the  user  cost
approach  and,  usually,  the  value  added  approach,  for  similar
reasons.
However,  as  Colangelo  and  Inklaar  (2012)  note,  statisti-
cal  agencies  have  usually  considered  the  user  cost  approach,
according  to  which  banks  do  not  charge  explicit  fees  for
many  of  the  services  they  provide  but  bundle  the  payment
for  services  with  the  interest  rates  charged  on  loans  and
paid  for  deposits.  This  approach  has  recently  been  given  a
new  twist  thanks  to  contributions  from  Colangelo  and  Inklaar
(2012),  Basu  et  al.  (2011)  and  Diewert  et  al.  (2012),  since
the  recent  international  financial  crisis  suggests  there  could
be  some  mismeasurements  in  the  banking  sector.8 Yet  most
of  these  proposals  are  based  on  information  that  is  only
available  at  the  country  level.  Therefore,  extending  these
revamped  contributions  to  the  bank  level  is  generally  notPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
possible  because  the  information  they  use  is  not  available
at  this  individual  level  of  disaggregation.
8 Specifically, Colangelo and Inklaar (2012) argue that the method-
ology currently used in the euro area (and in many other economies)
is flawed because it does not take into account the risk character-











In  this  study  we  face  the  added  difficulty  that,  since  we
re  focusing  on  the  detailed  de-composition  of  bank  profits,
e  must  be  able  to  attach  each  particular  revenue  to  each
utput  category.  This  implies  that  we  are  not  strictly  taking
he  asset  approach  to  define  output  be-cause  we  consider
ther  output  categories  apart  from  assets.  Specifically,  we
ill  consider  two  outputs,  namely:  (i)  loans,  which  represent
raditional  lending  activity;  and  (ii)  other  operating  income,
hich  refers  to  non-lending  activities.
A  further  added  difficulty  concerns  the  incorporation
f  banks’  risk-taking  behavior  into  the  estimation  of  effi-
iency  scores,  for  which  three  different  approaches  are
onsidered.  Following  previous  literature,  we  first  incor-
orate  non-performing  loans  (NPL)  into  the  profit  function
f  banks  as  an  additional  cost.  In  Spanish  accounting  stan-
ards,  Spanish  banks  must  classify  a  loan  as  non-performing
hen  either  interest  or  principal  payments  are  more  than
0  days  overdue.  In  addition,  all  loans  granted  to  the  bor-
owers  in  default  are  also  considered  as  non-performing,
rrespective  of  whether  or  not  they  are  overdue.  In  turn,
he  inputs  consist  of:  (i)  total  interest  expenses;  (ii)  per-
onnel  expenses;  and  (iii)  other  operating  expenses.  Table  3
rovides  detailed  definitions  of  inputs,  outputs,  and  their
orresponding  prices.  Analogously,  Table  4  provides  defini-
ions  for  the  loan  loss  provisions,  non-performing  loans  and
heir  associated  prices.
In  addition  to  bank  inefficiency,  we  also  consider  bank
ontrol  variables.  These  include  the  deposit  to  total
ssets  ratio  (B  DEPTA),  and  the  loans  to  total  assets  ratio
B  LOANTA).  As  Keeley  (1990)  states,  these  two  balance
heet  variables  reflect  the  notion  that  market  power  exists
or  both  deposit  and  loan  markets.
We  also  include  equity  to  total  asset  ratio  (B  EQTA),  since
 high  capital  ratio  might  suggest  a  highly  risky  loan  portfoliok-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
Casu  and  Girardone,  2006).  Salas  and  Saurina  (2003)  found
hat  banks  with  lower  capital  tended  to  operate  with  higher
evels  of  credit  risk  in  line  with  the  moral  hazard  hypothe-
is.  And  to  control  for  the  differences  between  commercial
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Table  3  Definition  of  costs,  revenues,  inputs,  outputs,  and  the  associated  prices.
Revenues  and  costs  Outputs  and  inputs  Output  and  input  prices
Revenues,  R  Definition  Output  (quantity),
y
Definition  Output  price,  r  Definition
R1 Interest  income
(interest  income
on  loans  +  other
interest  income)
y1 Customer  loans  r1 Price
corresponding  to
y1
R2 Other  operating
income





Operating  costs,  VC,  FC  Definition  Input  (quantity),
xv,  x  f
Definition  Input  price,  wv,
wf
Definition
VC1 Total  interest
expenses
xv1 Loanable  funds
(=financial  capital)
wv1 wv1 =  VC1/xv1
VC2 Personnel
expenses
xv2 Number  of
employees
wv2 wv2 =  VC2/xv2
FC1 Other  operating
expenses
xf1 Fixed  assets
(=physical  capital)
wf1 wf1 =  FC1/xf1
Table  4  Definition  of  loan  loss  provisions,  non-performing  loans  and  the  associated  prices.




loan  price,  r
Definition
LLP  Loan  loss
provisions






LLP +  llp1 LLP  +  increase
corresponding  to



















LLP +  llp1 (predicted)  Predicted  value







LLP +  llp2 (predicted)  Predicted  value

















anks  and  savings  banks  we  include  a  dummy  variable  that
quals  one  if  the  lender  is  a  commercial  bank  and  zero  oth-
rwise,  CB,  as  well  as  the  product  of  CB  and  B  INEF  ROA,
.e.  CB  INEF  ROA.Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
ata  on  non-financial  firms
e  also  consider  variables  at  the  firm  level,  namely,  the







elationships  of  the  non-financial  firm  (F  BANKREL),  when
any  banks  lend  to  the  same  borrower,  the  ‘‘soft’’  infor-
ation  is  much  more  diluted.  We  include  F  INV  COLLAT,
hich  is  the  inverse  measure  of  the  ability  of  the  firm’s  abil-
ty  pledge  collateral,  measured  as  the  ratio  of  total  bankk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ebt  to  non-current  assets,  as  well  as  F ZSCORE,  correspond-
ng  to  the  lagged  Altman  Z-score  formula  for  predicting
ankruptcy;  this  is  a  broader  concept  than  that  of  firm
nefficiency  or  firm  profitability.  The  last  two  variables  on
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Table  5  Bank  profit  efficiency  and  ex-ante  risk-taking  behavior.
Dependent  variable:  F  ZSCORE
(M1.1)  (M1.2)  (M1.3)  (M1.4)  (M1.5)  (M1.6)  (M1.7)
INTERCEPT  2.8934***  13.9390***  2.9918***  14.0277***  14.0168***  14.0153***  14.0295***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
F BANK  REL  −0.0653***  −0.0646***  −0.0645***  −0.0645***  −0.0646***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
F REGIS  −0.0055***  −0.0055***  −0.0055***  −0.0055***  −0.0055***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
B LOANTA  −0.2404**  −0.1645*  −0.1648*  −0.1636*  −0.1527*
(0.013)  (0.066)  (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.087)
B EQTA −0.4677 −0.5315* −0.5524** −0.5491**  −0.4934**
(0.163)  (0.055)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.044)
B DEPTA  0.1357  0.127  0.1381  0.1372  0.1058
(0.315)  (0.291)  (0.243)  (0.246)  (0.417)
B INEF  ROA  −1.8493**  −1.3209**  −1.7838**  −1.3365**  −1.0221
(0.011) (0.031)  (0.012)  (0.042)  (0.268)
B INEF  ROA  CS −1.5225**
(0.022)






#  of  observations 35,  039 34,  048 35,  039 34,  048  34,  048  34,  048  34,  048
R2 0.131  0.142  0.131  0.142  0.142  0.142  0.142
This table shows coefficient estimates for different regressions of firms’ lagged Z-score (F ZSCORE) on their lenders’ profit efficiency
and other control variables. P-values, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank clustering effects. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions: F BANK REL, number of bank relationships
(lagged); F REGIS, year of firm’s registration; B LOANTA, bank loan to total assets ratio; B EQTA, bank equity to total assets ratio;
B INEF ROA: bank profit inefficiency (with total loan loss provisions); B INEF ROA CS,  bank profit inefficiency (with expected loan loss




















bank time-series regressions); COMM BANK, dummy variable whic
CB INEF is the product of B INEF ROA and COMM BANK. All model
non-financial  firms  are  F  INT,  representing  firms’  interest
rates,  and  BANKRUPT, which  is  a  dummy  variable  that  equals
one  if  a  firm  defaults  and  zero  otherwise.  Stiglitz  and  Weiss
(1981)  show  that  higher  interest  rates  induce  firms  to  under-
take  projects  with  lower  probability  of  success.
Results
Analyzing  the  relationship  between  bank
performance  and  risk-taking  behavior
This  section  presents  evidence  on  the  relationship  of  bank
profit  efficiency  risk  taken  when  choosing  the  borrow-
ing  firms  (non-financial).  For  this  purpose,  three  different
scenarios  are  compared.  The  results  are  presented  in
Tables  5--8.
Hypothesis  1.  The  most  inefficient  banks  take  more  risksPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
when  selecting  their  borrowers
Hypothesis  1a.  The  most  inefficient  banks  will  lend  to  less





uals one if the lender is a commercial bank and zero otherwise;
ude year and industry fixed effects.
The  first  part  of  the  first  hypothesis  tests  whether  the
ost  inefficient  banks  lend  to  less  profitable  or  efficient
rms.  The  results  of  estimating  Eq.  (5)  are  shown  in  Table  5
nd  represent  the  link  of  firms’  Z-scores  (F  ZSCORE),  lagged,
ith  respect  to  their  lenders’  profit  efficiency  levels.  The
 ZSCORE  variable  is  Altman’s  Z-score  bankruptcy  predictor,
nd  it  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  firms’  financial  distress.
The  first  column  of  Table  5  (Model  (M1.1))  reports  the
esults  of  the  regression  when  only  bank  profit  inefficiency
s  included  as  an  independent  variable.  The  results  show
 statistically  significant  correlation  between  F  ZSCORE  and
 INEF  ROA  (bank  profit  inefficiency  including  total  loan  loss
rovisions).  This  negative  sign  might  be  corroborating  the
rst  hypothesis,  which  stated  that  the  most  inefficient  banks
ill  lend  to  less  profitable  firms.  In  other  words,  the  most
nefficient  banks  will  grant  the  loan,  despite  being  aware
f  the  relative  insolvency  of  their  client.  Although  several
xplanations  for  this  strategy  might  exist,  and  we  should  not
iscard  the  possible  existence  of  reverse  causality  (whichk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ould  deserve  a  specific  investigation),  these  banks  might
e  trying  to  offset  their  lack  of  profit  efficiency  by  increasing
heir  customers  base,  which  would  be  partly  achieved  by
elaxing  the  requirements  for  lending  (Foos  et  al.,  2010).
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Table  6  Bank  profit  efficiency  and  borrower  defaults.
Dependent  variable:  BANKRUPT
(M2.1)  (M2.2)  (M2.3)  (M2.4)  (M2.5)  (M2.6)  (M2.7)
INTERCEPT  −4.0507***  −4.2281***  −32.9385***  −32.8738***  −32.8240***  −32.8275***  −32.8193***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
F BANK  REL  0.1465***  0.1436***  0.1434***  0.1434***  0.1428***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
F REGIS  0.0145***  0.0144***  0.0144***  0.0144***  0.0144***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
B LOANTA  0.8919***  0.8992***  0.8970***  0.8933***  0.8841***
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)
B EQTA −3.4473** −3.0617* −2.9387* −2.9492*  −3.2103**
(0.033) (0.059)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.039)
B DEPTA  −0.4799  −0.7388**  −0.7708**  −0.7623**  −0.7615**
(0.166) (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.039)
B INEF  ROA  4.9897***  6.1429***  4.2594***  6.0942***  4.8671***
(0.008) (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.003)
B INEF  ROA  CS 6.4530***
(0.000)




CB INEF  ROA 4.1797
(0.137)
#  of  observations 45,  049 45,  049 41,  046 41,  046  41,  046  41,  046  41,  046
R2 0.0601  0.0614  0.0681  0.0696  0.0696  0.0696  0.0696
This table reports results from a logit model of borrower defaults. The dependent variable BANKRUPT equals one if a firm defaults (files
for bankruptcy), and zero otherwise. P-values, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank clustering effects.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions: F BANK REL, number of bank
relationships (lagged); F REGIS, year of firm’s registration; B LOANTA, bank loans to total assets ratio; B EQTA, bank equity to total assets
ratio; B INEF ROA: bank profit inefficiency (with total loan loss provisions); B INEF ROA CS,  bank profit inefficiency (with expected loan









































on bank time-series regressions); COMM BANK, dummy variable w
CB INEF is the product of B INEF ROA and COMM BANK. All model
The  second  regression  (second  column  in  Table  5, Model
M1.2))  adds  two  regressors  related  to  the  borrowing  firms,
amely,  the  age  of  the  company  (F  REGIS) and  the  number  of
ending  banks  each  company  has  (F  BANK  REL). Results  show
he  three  variables  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on
he  firms’  Z  SCORE. The  signs  of  the  relationship  are  nega-
ive,  implying  that  the  least  profitable  firms  have  fewer  bank
enders,  are  younger,  and  borrow  from  the  most  inefficient
anks.  If  a  firm  is  a  poor  financial  performer,  fewer  banks
ill  be  willing  to  grant  it  a  loan.  Diamond  (1991)  argues
hat  companies  in  continuous  existence  for  longer  periods
ave  already  shown  they  can  survive  the  difficulties  in  the
arly  stages  of  their  business  life.  Cole  (1998)  finds  evidence
hat  firms  receiving  loans  are  older  and  more  profitable.
owever,  the  B  INEF  ROA  variable  is  the  one  with  a  highest
oefficient  and,  therefore,  it  is  the  most  important  variable
or  the  least  profitable  companies.
The  third  regression  (third  column  in  Table  5,  Model
M1.3))  considers  bank-related  variables,  instead  of  firm-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
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elated  variables.  The  variables  taken  into  account  are
 INEF  ROA, B  LOANTA  (bank  loan  to  total  assets  ratio),
 EQTA  (bank  equity  to  total  assets  ratio)  and  B  DEPTA  (total





quals one if the lender is a commercial bank and zero otherwise;
ude year and industry fixed effects.
 INEF  ROA  and  B  LOANTA  variables  are  statistically  signifi-
ant,  and  their  effect  is  negative.  This  would  indicate  that
anks  with  a  higher  share  of  loans  to  total  assets  are  the
nes  lending  to  the  riskiest  firms.  This  result  is  in  line  with
oos  et  al.  (2010),  who  found  that  credit  growth  contributes
o  increased  bank  risk.  Again,  the  variable  representing
ender’s  inefficiency,  with  a  coefficient  of  −1.7838,  has  the
reatest  impact  on  the  firm’s  economic  situation.
The  fourth  regression  (fourth  column  in  Table  5, Model
M1.4))  considers  both  types  of  variables----i.e.  related  to
oth  non-financial  firms  and  banks.  All  variables  are  sig-
ificant  and  with  a negative  sign,  except  B  DEPTA, which
emains  non-significant.  The  B  LOANTA  variable  is  less  sig-
ificant  than  in  Model  (M1.3).  However,  the  B  EQTA, related
o  banks’  insolvency,  is  now  significant----although  only  at
he  10%  significance  level,  i.e.,  banks’  insolvency  levels  do
nfluence  their  borrowers’  probability  of  bankruptcy.
Models  (M1.5)  and  (M1.6)  (fifth  and  sixth  columns  in
able  5) only  differ  from  those  in  Model  (M1.4)  in  thek-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ay  they  measure  bank  inefficiency.  Model  (M1.5)  uses  the
 INEF  ROA  CS  variable,  i.e.  bank  profit  inefficiency  with
xpected  loan  loss  provisions  based  on  year  crosssection
egressions.  Results  are  similar,  and  the  main  differences
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Table  7  Bank  profit  efficiency,  interest  rates  and  collateral.
Dependent  variable:  F  INT, F  INV  COLLAT
F  INT  F  INV  COLLAT  F  INT  F  INV  COLLAT  F  INT  F  INV  COLLAT  F  INT  F  INV  COLLAT
(M3.1) (M3.2)  (M3.3)  (M3.4)  (M3.5)  (M3.6)  (M3.7)  (M3.8)
CONSTANT  0.2298***  −34.0838***  0.2302***  −34.0828***  0.2302***  −34.0963***  0.2278***  −34.1249***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
F BANKREL  −0.0007***  0.1364***  −0.0007***  0.1364***  −0.0007***  0.1365***  −0.0007***  0.1355***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
F REGIS  −0.0001***  0.0179***  −0.0001***  0.0179***  −0.0001***  0.0179***  −0.0001***  0.0179***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
B LOANTA 0.0070***  0.1205  0.0070**  0.1207  0.0070**  0.1208  0.0061**  −0.0138
(0.010) (0.541)  (0.010)  (0.537)  (0.011)  (0.542)  (0.018)  (0.941)
B EQTA  −0.0129  −2.4607**  −0.0126  −2.4627**  −0.0125  −2.4780**  −0.0147  −2.9674***
(0.267) (0.011)  (0.278)  (0.011)  (0.281)  (0.010)  (0.199)  (0.000)
B DEPTA  −0.0026  −0.1739  −0.0028  −0.1796  −0.0029  −0.1591  0.0002  0.0298
(0.541) (0.509)  (0.506)  (0.484)  (0.501)  (0.539)  (0.962)  (0.921)
B INEF  ROA 0.0276  −0.769  0.0207  −5.0722**
(0.170) (0.714)  (0.344)  (0.022)
B INEF  ROA  CS 0.0318*  −0.6505
(0.082)  (0.790)
B INEF ROA  TS 0.0322*  −1.0282
(0.074)  (0.677)
CB 0.0009  −0.0391
(0.315)  (0.596)
CB INEF ROA 0.0538*  18.2747***
(0.097)  (0.000)
# of  observations 38,  142 34,  007 38,  142 34,  007 38,  142  34,  007  38,  142  34,  007
R2 0.379  0.067  0.379  0.067  0.379  0.067  0.379  0.067
This table shows coefficient estimates for different regressions of firms’ interest rates (F INT) and an inverse measure of the ability
of the firm to pledge collateral (F INV COLLAT) on their lenders’ profit efficiency and other control variables. P-values, reported in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank clustering effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels. Variable definitions: F INT, interest the firm pays over total bank debt; F INV COLLAT, ratio of total bank debt to non-current
assets; F BANK REL, number of bank relationships (lagged); F REGIS, year of firm’s registration; B LOANTA, bank loan to total assets’
ratio; B EQTA, bank equity to total asset ratio; B INEF ROA: bank profit inefficiency (with total loan loss provisions); B INEF ROA CS,  bank
profit inefficiency (with expected loan loss provisions based on year cross-section regressions); B INEF ROA TS,  bank profit inefficiency















is a commercial bank and zero otherwise; CB INEF is the product 
fixed effects.
are,  first,  that  the  B  EQTA  variable  improves  the  level  of
significance  from  10%  to  5%  and,  in  addition,  that  the
coefficient  corresponding  to  bank  inefficiency  increases  (in
absolute  terms)  from  −1.3365  to  −1.5225.  The  measure  of
the  inefficiency  of  banks  in  Model  (M1.6)  is  B  INEF  ROA  TS,
bank  profit  inefficiency  with  expected  loan  loss  provisions
based  on  bank  time-series  regressions,  and  results  do  not
show  significant  differences  from  Model  (M1.5).
For  Model  (M1.7)  (seventh  column  in  Table  5)  we  include
two  additional  variables,  CB  INEF  and  COMM  BANK, to  check
for  differences  between  savings  banks  and  commercial
banks.  Results  indicate  that  the  B  INEF  ROA  variable  is  not
statistically  significant.  We  can  conclude  that  the  relation-
ship  between  bank  inefficiency  and  their  borrowing  firms’
low  profitability  levels  is  not  affected  by  the  type  of  bank
(commercial  banks  or  savings  banks).
From  these  results  we  can  infer  that  bank  profit  inef-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
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ficiency  indicates  that  they  are  taking  an  ex  ante  risk,  risk
being  measured  as  the  lagged  Z-score  of  the  borrowing  firms.
It  is  therefore  possible  to  tentatively  conclude  that  less  effi-





INEF ROA and COMM BANK. All models include year and industry
ypothesis  1b.  Firms  that  obtain  credits  from  inefficient
anks  are  more  likely  to  go  bankrupt
The  second  part  of  the  first  hypothesis  concerning  ex
ost  risk,  test  whether  the  most  inefficient  banks  have  a
igher  number  of  customers  in  bankruptcy.  Table  6  reports
he  results  of  estimating  Eq.  (7)  and,  as  in  Table  5,  presents
even  different  models  to  analyze  the  relationship  between
anks’  inefficiency  and  firms’  (clients’)  bankruptcy.
In  Model  (M2.1)  (first  column  of  Table  6)  the  inde-
endent  variable  is  B  INEF  ROA. Results  show  that  this
ariable  is  statistically  significant,  and  has  a  positive  sign.
herefore,  Hypothesis  1.b,  according  to  which  the  most  inef-
cient  banks  have  a  higher  number  of  borrowing  firms  in
ankruptcy,  is  corroborated.
Model  (M2.2)  (second  column  in  Table  6)  includes  the
ariables  specific  to  banks,  B  LOANTA,  B  EQTA  and  B  DEPTA.k-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
esults  show  that  B  LOANTA,  B  EQTA  and  B  INEF  ROA  varia-
les  are  statistically  significant.  The  sign,  or  B EQTA  it  is
egative,  whereas  in  the  other  two  cases  it  is  positive.
herefore,  we  can  reiterate  that  the  most  inefficient  banks
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Table  8  Profit  efficiency  and  the  lending  behavior  of  Spanish  savings  banks:  home  vs.  new  markets.
Dependent  variable:  F  ZSCORE, F  INT
Home  markets  New  markets  Home  markets  New  markets
F ZSCORE  F  ZSCORE  F  INT  F  INT
(M4.1) (M4.2)  (M4.3)  (M4.4)
CONSTANT  12.6982***  12.9906***  0.1483***  −37.9152***
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)
F BANKREL  −0.0670***  −0.0357***  −0.0005  0.1341***
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.286)  (0.000)
F REGIS  −0.0050***  −0.0053***  0  0.0199***
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.140)  (0.000)
B LOANTA −0.0714 −0.0872 0.0177**  0.3620
(0.790)  (0.475)  (0.014)  (0.478)
B EQTA  −0.1609  1.3337***  0.0638  −5.6549***
(0.826) (0.005)  (0.061)  (0.000)
B DEPTA  0.3708*  0.2498  −0.0038  0.1181
(0.079)  (0.150)  (0.700)  (0.795)
B INEF  ROA −0.6187  −1.6645**  0.0390**  −7.5265***
(0.650) (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.001)
# of  observations  5920  7321  6787  5701
R2 0.141  0.157  0.325  0.082
This table shows coefficient estimates for different regressions of firms’ lagged Altman Z-score (Z SCORE), firms’ interest rates (F INT) and
an inverse measure of the firm’s ability to pledge collateral (F INV COLLAT) on their lenders’ profit efficiency and other control variables.
P-values, reported in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and bank clustering effects. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions: F INT, interest the firm pays over total bank debt; F INV COLLAT, ratio
of total bank debt to non-current assets; F BANK REL, number of bank relationships (lagged); F REGIS, year of firm’s registration;
B LOANTA, bank loan to total asset ratio; B EQTA, bank equity to total asset ratio; B INEF ROA: bank profit inefficiency (with total loan
loss provisions); B INEF ROA CS,  bank profit inefficiency (with expected loan loss provisions based on year cross-section regressions);















































variable which equals one if the lender is a commercial bank and z
All models include year and industry fixed effects.
ave  more  customers  in  bankruptcy.  In  contrast,  banks  with
 higher  proportion  of  loans  with  lower  solvency  levels  also
ave  more  bankruptcies  among  their  borrowers.  However,
he  fact  that  banks  have  a  higher  proportion  of  deposits  does
ot  affect  the  number  of  bankruptcies  among  their  borrow-
ng  firms,  since  the  B  DEPTA  variable  is  not  significant.
Model  (M2.3)  (third  column  in  Table  6) also  includes  varia-
les  relative  to  borrowing  firms----F REGIS  and  F  BANK  REL.
he  three  variables  (F  REGIS, F  BANK  REL  and  also
 INEF  ROA) are  statistically  significant,  with  a  positive  sign,
mplying  that  the  higher  the  inefficiency  of  the  lending
ank  (B  INEF  ROA), the  higher  the  age  of  the  borrowing
rm  (F  REGIS), and  the  higher  the  number  of  banking  rela-
ionships  (F  BANK  REL) the  borrowing  firm  has,  the  greater
he  probability  of  bankruptcy.  This  finding  might  not  be  a
riori  in  line  with  some  literature  (Jiménez  and  Saurina,
004)  which  has  indicated  that  when  firms  have  relation-
hips  with  more  banks,  then  it  is  more  difficult  for  any
f  them  to  monopolize  the  information  on  the  borrower’s
uality,  so  that  the  incentives  to  finance  higher-risk  bor-
owers  decrease.  However,  some  links  might  be  intricate,
s  interactions  (for  instance,  between  the  number  of  bank
elationships  and  bank  inefficiency)  might  also  be  playing  aPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
ole.
Model  (M2.4)  (fourth  column  in  Table  6)  takes  into




therwise; CB INEF is the product of B INEF ROA and COMM BANK.
o  non-financial  firms.  Results  show  that  all  the  variables
re  statistically  significant,  although  B  EQTA  is  significant
nly  at  the  10%  level.  The  signs  are  positive  for  all  varia-
les  except  for  B  EQTA  and  B  DEPTA. Therefore,  we  can
laim  that  the  higher  the  number  of  banking  relationships
F  BANK  REL), the  more  years  of  experience  firms’  have
F  REGIS), the  higher  the  proportion  of  loans  of  the  lend-
ng  bank  (B  LOANTA),  the  lower  the  capital  ratio  (B  EQTA),
he  lower  the  volume  of  deposits  as  a  share  of  total  assets
B  DEPTA),  and  the  more  inefficient  the  lending  bank  is
B  INEF  ROA), the  higher  the  probability  of  bankruptcy  of
he  borrowing  firm  (BANKRUPT).
Model  (M2.5)  and  (M2.6)  (fifth  and  sixth  columns  in
able  6)  consider  different  measures  of  bank  inefficiency.
odel  (M5)  considers  the  variable  B  INEF  ROA  CS,  whereas
odel  (M6)  considers  B  INEF  ROA  TS.  However,  results  are
irtually  identical  to  those  corresponding  to  model  four,  and
he  interpretation  should  be  the  same  as  well.
Model  (M2.7)  (column  seven  of  Table  6)  includes  two  addi-
ional  variables.  First,  a  dummy  (CB)  indicating  whether  the
ender  is  a  commercial  bank  or  not.  Second,  the  variable
B  INEF  (result  of  multiplying  B  INEF  ROA  and  COMM  BANK).
hese  two  variables  are  intended  to  determine  whetherk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
here  is  any  connection  with  the  fact  that  the  lender  is  a
ommercial  bank  or  otherwise.  The  main  difference  with
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ratio  corresponding  to  the  lending  bank,  increases  its  level
of  significance,  and  the  impact  of  the  variable  representing
lender  inefficiency  (B  INEF  ROA) is  now  lower  (from  6.0942
to  4.8671).  The  two  new  variables  added,  CB  and  CB  INEF
are  not  statistically  significant.
The  results  of  the  first  hypothesis  are  in  line  with
the  ‘‘bad  management’’  hypothesis  (Berger  and  DeYoung,
1997a,b;  Williams,  2004),  although  these  studies  consider
only  ex  post  measure  of  risk,  which  is  related  to  loans  (not  to
the  profitability  levels  of  the  borrowing  firms).  However,  in
the  case  of  Spanish  savings  banks  and  commercial  banks,  we
have  also  found  empirical  evidence  that  the  most  inefficient
banks  are  also  those  that  take  more  risks.
Hypothesis  2.  The  interest  rates  charged  by  the  most  inef-
ficient  banks  are  higher  due  to  their  risk-taking  behavior
The  second  hypothesis  tests,  first,  whether  because  they
are  more  risky,  the  most  inefficient  banks  charge  higher
interest  rates,  and,  second,  whether  they  lend  to  compa-
nies  with  less  collateral.  Table  7  presents  the  results  of
estimating  Eqs.  (7)  and  (8).
To  test  this  hypothesis  eight  different  models  are  used.
The  dependent  variable  in  the  first  model  (Model  (M1),  col-
umn  1  in  Table  7)  is  F  INT  (interest  rate  firms  pay),  and  the
independent  variables  are  F  BANKREL,  F  REGIS, B  LOANTA,
B  EQTA, B  DEPTA  and  B  INEF  ROA. Results  are  statistically
significant  for  variables  F  BANKREL,  F  REGIS  and  B  LOANTA,
with  a  negative  sign  for  the  first  two.  This  would  imply  that
the  interest  rate  firms  pay  is  determined  by  fewer  banking
relationships,  fewer  years  of  existence,  and  a  higher  loans
ratio  from  the  lending  bank.
Regarding  the  number  of  banking  relationships,  some
firms  have  less  access  to  credit  and,  following  Stiglitz  and
Weiss  (1981)  and  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1994),  it  may  be  con-
sidered  that  these  are  riskier  firms  which  are  willing  to  pay
higher  interest  rates.  Concerning  firm  age  (F  REGIS), Boot
and  Thakor  (1994)  show  that  during  their  initial  years,  firms
must  pay  higher  interest  rates.  However,  as  time  passes  and
they  become  economically  viable,  they  are  charged  lower
interest  rates.  Furthermore,  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Huizinga
(1999)  find  empirical  evidence  that  the  share  of  loans  to
total  assets  for  banks  is  one  of  the  main  determinants  of  net
margins  from  interest  rates.
Model  (M3.2)  (column  2  in  Table  7)  differs  from  Model
(M1)  in  the  dependent  variable,  which  is  now  F  INV  COLLAT
(i.e.  the  ratio  of  total  bank  debt  to  non-current  assets).  As
Berger  and  Udell  (1995)  note,  most  of  the  empirical  liter-
ature  on  the  subject  considers  collateral  to  be  related  to
riskier  borrowers  and  riskier  loans.  However,  our  proposal
differs  from  others  in  how  to  estimate  the  variable  related
to  the  collateral.  In  this  study  we  use  an  inverse  measure  of
the  firms’  ability  to  pledge  collateral.  Results  are  statisti-
cally  significant  for  F  BANKREL,  F  REGIS  and  B  EQTA, with  a
positive  sign  for  the  first  two  variables  and  negative  for  the
third.  These  results  would  imply  that  the  borrowing  firms  can
pledge  less  collateral  (and,  therefore,  bear  more  risk)  havePlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
more  bank  relationships,  are  older,  and  the  bank  lender  has
a  lower  capital  ratio.  In  this  case,  again,  the  inefficiency







Model  (M3.2)  (column  3  in  Table  7)  considers  F  INT  as  the
ependent  variable,  and  B  INEF  ROA  CS  as  the  bank  ineffi-
iency  measure.  In  this  case,  similarly  to  the  first  model,
 BANKREL,  F  REGIS  and  F LOANTA  are  statistically  signifi-
ant,  and  with  the  same  sign  as  in  the  first  model.  However,
he  measure  of  inefficiency,  B  INEF  ROA  CS  is  also  statisti-
ally  significant,  albeit  with  a  significance  of  only  10%,  and
ith  a positive  sign.  Therefore,  it  can  be  argued  that  the
nterest  rate  firms  pay  is  conditioned  by  the  inefficiency
f  the  lending  bank----the higher  the  banks’  inefficiency,  the
igher  the  interest  rates  they  charge.
Model  (M3.4)  (column  4 in  Table  7)  considers  as  the
ependent  variable  F INV  COLLAT,  and  results  do  not  differ
rom  those  yielded  by  Model  (M3.2).
Model  (M3.5)  (column  5  in  Table  7)  uses  F  INT  as
he  dependent  variable,  and  the  measure  of  ineffi-
iency  is  B  INEF  ROA  TS.  Results  are  similar  to  those
ielded  by  Model  (M3.3),  since  inefficiency  is  statistically
ignificant----although  only  at  the  10%  level.
In  Model  (M3.6)  (column  6  in  Table  7)  the  dependent
ariable  is  F  INV  COLLAT, and  the  measure  of  inefficiency
s  B  INEF  ROA  TS.  Results  are  similar  to  those  from  Models
M3.4)  and  (M3.2).
The  last  two  models  (Models  (M3.7)  and  (M3.8),  corre-
ponding  to  columns  7  and  8  in  Table  7) used  the  B  INEF  ROA
ariable  as  a  measure  of  inefficiency,  also  adding  the  CB
nd  CB INEF  ROA  variables.  The  results  for  Model  (M7)  show
hat  F BANKREL,  F  REGIS, B  LOANTA  and  CB  INEF  ROA  varia-
les  are  statistically  significant,  although  the  last  one  has  a
ow  significance  level.  The  sign  is  negative  for  the  first  two
ariables,  and  positive  for  the  second  two.  Therefore,  we
ay  tentatively  conclude  that  the  interest  rate  a  firm  pays
s  determined  by  fewer  banking  relationships  (F  BANKREL),
ewer  years  of  experience  (F  REGIS), and  a  higher  share
f  loans  in  the  lending  bank  (B  LOANTA).  These  results  are
he  same  as  those  obtained  with  Model  (M3.1)  but,  in  addi-
ion,  they  are  conditioned  by  the  inefficiency  of  commercial
anks.
Model  (M3.8)  differs  from  Model  (M3.7)  in  the  depen-
ent  variable,  which  in  this  model  is  F  INV  COLLAT.  Results
re  similar  to  those  corresponding  to  Model  (M3.2),  i.e.
hey  are  statistically  significant  for  F  BANKREL,  F  REGIS  and
 EQTA. In  addition,  in  this  case  the  B  INEF  ROA  variable
s  statistically  significant  and  negative,  whereas  B  INEF  ROA
s  statistically  significant  and  with  a  positive  sign.  There-
ore,  it  may  be  considered  that  the  firms’  ability  to  pledge
ollateral  is  conditioned  by  a  higher  number  of  bank  rela-
ionships  (F  BANKREL),  more  years  of  experience  (F  REGIS),
ower  capital  ratio  (as  a  share  of  the  lending  bank’s  total
ssets,  B  EQTA) and,  especially,  higher  lending  bank  effi-
iency  (B  INEF  ROA)----particularly  if  the  lender  is  a  savings
ank  (CB  INEF  ROA).
A  positive  relationship  of  inefficiency  with  F  INV  COLLAT
ndicates  that  the  most  inefficient  banks  lend  to  firms  with
elatively  less  ability  to  pledge  collateral,  which  contributes
o  increase  credit  risk.  Jiménez  and  Saurina  (2004)  find
mpirical  evidence  for  the  Spanish  case  that  loans  with
igher  levels  of  collateral  are  more  likely  to  default.k-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ypothesis  3.  Savings  bank  inefficiency  will  affect  the  type
f  borrowers  depending  on  whether  they  are  located  in  the
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The  third  and  last  of  the  hypotheses  considers  whether
panish  savings  banks  behave  differently  depending  on
hether  they  operate  in  their  home  markets  or  new  mar-
ets.  Table  8  reports  the  results  of  estimating  Eqs.  (9)  and
10).  The  results  for  Eq.  (9),  which  considers  whether  bank
nefficiency  influences  the  probability  of  borrowing  firms’
ankruptcy,  taking  into  account  lenders’  location,  are  pre-
ented  in  columns  1  and  2  (Models  (M1)  and  (M2))  of  Table  8.
Model  (M4.1)  (column  1  in  Table  8)  considers  the
 ZSCORE  as  the  dependent  variable,  and  focuses  on  firms
ocated  in  the  same  region  of  origin  as  the  savings  banks’
enders.  Results  are  statistically  significant  for  F  BANKREL,
 REGIS  and  F  DEPTA,  the  first  two  with  negative  signs.
herefore,  it  could  be  argued  that  for  firms  located  in  the
ame  region  as  the  lending  savings  bank,  the  probability
f  bankruptcy  depends  on  having  more  bank  relationships
F  BANKREL),  being  older  (F  REGIS), and  the  lending  savings
ank  having  a  lower  ratio  of  deposits  (B  DEPTA). However,
avings  bank  inefficiency  is  not  significant  in  the  home  mar-
ets  (B  INEF  ROA).
Model  (M4.2)  (column  2  in  Table  8)  also  considered
ZSCORE  as  the  dependent  variable,  but  in  this  case  refer-
ing  to  borrowing  firms  that  savings  banks  classify  as  located
n  new  markets----i.e.  they  are  outside  their  home  mar-
ets.  Results  indicate  that  the  variables  influencing  the
robability  of  bankruptcy  for  these  firms  are  F  BANKREL,
REGIS, B  EQTA  and  B  INEF  ROA; of  these,  only  B  EQTA
as  a  positive  sign.  Therefore,  we  may  consider  that  the
robability  of  bankruptcy  for  these  firms  is  determined  by
aving  more  bank  relationships  (F  BANKREL),  being  older
F  REGIS), and  by  lending  savings  banks  having  a  lower  cap-
tal  ratio  (B  EQTA) and  being  more  inefficient  (B  INEF  ROA).
hese  results  corroborate  Hypothesis  3.a,  since  the  proba-
ility  of  a  firm  going  bankrupt  depends  on  the  inefficiency
f  lending  savings  banks  when  they  are  located  in  new
arkets.
Estimating  Eq.  (10)  verifies  whether  savings  banks’  inef-
ciency  will  influence  the  interest  rates  borrowing  firms  pay
ccording  to  their  location;  these  results  are  reported  in
olumns  3  and  4  of  Table  8.
The  results  for  Model  (M4.3)  (column  3  in  Table  8)  sug-
est  that  for  borrowing  firms  located  in  savings  banks’  home
arkets,  the  interest  rates  paid  (as  a  share  of  total  bank
ebt)  depend  on  savings  banks’  ratio  of  loans  on  total  assets
B  LOANTA),  their  capital  ratio  (on  total  assets,  B  EQTA), and
heir  inefficiency  (B  INEF  ROA). Inefficient  savings  banks,
herefore,  might  be  increasing  the  interest  rates  they  charge
ecause  of  their  market  power  in  home  markets.
Results  on  borrowing  firms  in  new  markets  differ  con-
iderably.  Those  for  Model  (M4.4)  (column  4  of  Table  8)
how  that  the  interest  firms  pay  depends  positively  on  their
umber  of  banking  relationships  (F  BANKREL)  and  their  age
F  REGIS), and  negatively  on  the  ratio  of  capital  (on  total
ssets,  B EQTA) of  the  lending  savings  bank  and  its  ineffi-
iency  level  (B  INEF  ROA). In  conclusion,  the  efficiency  of
he  lending  savings  banks  will  influence  the  interest  rates
heir  borrowers  pay.
The  results  of  estimating  Eq.  (10)  confirm  Hypothesis  3.b,Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  García-Alcober,  M.,  et  al.,  Ris
A  profit  frontier  approach.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2019,  https://doi.
nd  are  in  line  with  other  studies  that  have  found  empirical
vidence  on  the  differing  behavior  of  savings  banks  accord-
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The  results  of  estimating  Eq.  (10)  confirm  Hypothesis  3b,
nd  are  in  line  with  other  studies  that  have  found  empirical
vidence  on  the  differing  behavior  of  savings  banks  accord-
ng  to  the  markets  in  which  they  operate  (Illueca  et  al.,
014).
onclusions
he  attention  given  to  credit  risk  from  both  theoretical  and
mpirical  points  of  view  is  extensive.  However,  despite  the
umber  of  contributions  is  now  high,  most  of  this  research
as  focused  on  particular  topics  such  as  how  to  evaluate
x  ante  risks  of  individual  loan  operations  and/or  borrow-
rs,  and  how  lenders  (bank)  react  to  the  evaluations  (Salas
nd  Saurina,  2002).  We  adopt  here  a  different  perspec-
ive,  by  examining  the  links  between  bank  performance  and
isk-taking  behavior,  that  is,  how  several  (nonfinancial)  firm
haracteristics,  especially  regarding  credit  worthiness,  are
elated  to  different  measures  of  bank  performance.  Our
tudy  differs  from  previous  contributions  that  have  empha-
ized  the  importance  of  the  relationship  between  banks  and
heir  borrowing  (nonfinancial)  firms  in  that  we  attempt  to
odel  explicitly  the  links  between  the  financial  situation  of
he  borrowing  firms  and  the  risk  banks  take,  and  how  banks’
erformance  affects  this  link.
We  established  three  hypotheses  for  the  analysis:  (i)
hether  the  most  inefficient  banks  take  higher  risks  when
electing  their  borrowers  (which  we  further  decompose  into
wo  additional  hypotheses:  whether  the  most  inefficient
anks  lend  to  less  profitable  or  more  inefficient  firms,  and
hether  firms  that  obtain  loans  from  inefficient  banks  are
ore  likely  to  go  bankrupt);  (ii)  whether  the  interest  rates
harged  by  the  most  inefficient  banks  are  higher,  due  to  their
isk-taking  behavior;  and  (iii)  whether  savings  bank  ineffi-
iency  affects  the  type  of  borrowers  depending  on  whether
hey  are  located  in  the  savings  bank’s  home  markets  or  new
arkets.  Testing  these  hypotheses  requires  extending  the
atabase  on  Spanish  banks  to  include  data  on  their  borrow-
ng  firms  and  some  of  their  characteristics,  such  as  the  year
hen  the  firm  was  created,  the  number  of  bank  relation-
hips  it  has,  its  ability  to  pledge  collateral,  the  probability
f  bankruptcy,  the  interest  rates  it  is  charged  and  whether
t  actually  went  bankrupt.  These  hypotheses,  however,  are
ot  evaluated  directly  since  our  point  is  that  there  are  some
ndirect  effects  that  the  literature  has  generally  avoided
uch  as,  for  instance,  poor  senior  practices  that  do  not  have
 direct  impact  on  borrowers’  risk  but  rather  an  indirect
mpact  via  bank  inefficiency.
In addition,  we  also  considered  innovative  measures  of
rofit  efficiency  which  take  into  account  different  ways  of
efining  banks’  profits.  Following  contributions  in  the  field
f  earnings  quality  and  earnings  management,  we  consid-
red  a  model  in  which  bank  managers  can  ‘‘manipulate’’  the
esults,  as  well  as  two  others  in  which  loan  loss  provisions
re  estimated  in  the  first  stage  and  then  plugged-in  into  the
rofit  model  in  the  second  stage.  This  is  also  particularly
elevant  as  it  provides  an  alternative  method  for  evaluat-k-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performance:
org/10.1016/j.brq.2019.02.003
ng  the  effects  of  the  Bank  of  Spain’s  dynamic  provisioning
Jiménez  et  al.,  2017).
The  results  suggest  that  there  is  actually  a  relationship
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Risk-taking  behavior,  earnings  quality,  and  bank  performanc
when  lending  to  firms.  Specifically,  we  find  that  more  inef-
ficient  banks  lent  to  the  worst  performing  firms.  Moreover,
this  high  risk-taking  behavior  is  not  offset  by  higher  interest
rates.  When  considering  collateral,  there  is  no  evidence  for
a  relationship  between  bank  inefficiency  and  firms  able  to
pledge  less  collateral,  but  this  link  exists  when  commercial
banks  and  savings  banks  are  analyzed  separately.
The  last  hypothesis  applies  to  savings  banks  only  and  tests
whether  their  behavior  is  different  in  home  markets  than  in
new  markets.  Results  show  that  the  most  efficient  savings
banks  have  an  ex  ante  risk  in  the  new  markets,  and  charge
higher  interest  rates.  In  contrast,  most  inefficient  savings
banks  charge  higher  interest  rates  in  their  home  markets.
These  results  could  constitute  evidence  of  the  savings  banks’
market  power  in  their  home  markets----especially  during  the
years  prior  to  the  financial  crisis.
Our  results  are  relevant  for  several  reasons.  Among  them,
we  should  highlight  that  the  usefulness  of  efficiency  mea-
sures  to  identify  the  likely  existence  of  non-performing
loans  (i.e.,  ex  post  risk)  or  greater  probability  of  default.
It  opens  a  promising  area  of  research,  since  the  analysis
can  be  improved  in  several  directions  and,  consequently,
the  economic  policy  recommendations  be  sharper  and  more
accurate.  For  instance,  although  our  study  was  also  inno-
vative  due  to  the  efficiency  measures  proposed,  other
measures  can  also  be  used,  making  the  analysis  more  robust.
However,  we  consider  relevant  to  adopt  an  approach  like
ours,  in  which  the  definition  of  efficiency  takes  into  account
the  likely  manipulation  of  loan  loss  provisions,  an  issue
often  disregarded  when  considering  these  measures.  Addi-
tionally,  we  can  also  contemplate  different  lags,  to  evaluate
how  bank  inefficiency  and  their  borrowers’  risk  character-
istics  interact  over  time.  Finally,  although  the  analysis  was
focused  on  the  Spanish  banking  system,  it  would  be  worth
corroborating  whether  our  findings  hold  across  financial  sys-
tems,  particularly  in  countries  where  the  2007/08  crisis  was
harsher.
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